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    NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
          
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 10-1554 
 ___________ 
 
 MUKASH KUMAR MANEKLAL PATEL, 
        Petitioner 
 
 v. 
 
 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
   Respondent 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
 Board of Immigration Appeals 
 (Agency No. A074-586-999) 
 Immigration Judge:  Honorable Eugene Pugliese 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
February 23, 2011 
 Before:  BARRY, HARDIMAN and STAPLETON, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed:  February 24, 2011) 
 ___________ 
 
 OPINION 
 ___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
Mukash Kumar Maneklal Patel, a citizen of India, entered the United States 
without inspection in January 1996.  The former Immigration and Naturalization Service 
took him into custody in Texas.  On January 14, 1996, Patel was personally served with 
  
2 
 
an Order to Show Cause, which charged him with being deportable pursuant to former 
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) § 241(a)(1)(B) [8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B)].  
The Order to Show Cause was read to Patel in Hindi, and Patel acknowledged receipt by 
signing the Order.  On April 5, 1996, Patel posted bond and was released from detention.  
Patel later asserted that he was unaware of who had posted the money for his release, and 
“walked around aimlessly for 6 hours in the rain” until he found a bus depot.  Patel 
boarded a bus for St. Louis, Missouri.  Shortly thereafter, he traveled to Milwaukee, 
Wisconsin. 
Meanwhile, Patel’s family hired Saul Brown, an attorney in New York, who 
entered his appearance on April 12, 1996.  On April 23, 1996, Attorney Brown submitted 
a motion to change venue, asserting that Patel was staying with friends in New Jersey.  
Over the Government’s objections, the Immigration Court granted the motion and 
transferred the matter to the Immigration Court in Newark, New Jersey.  By certified 
letter dated May 24, 1996, the Immigration Court notified Attorney Brown that Patel’s 
master calendar hearing was scheduled for September 13, 1996.  The record contains a 
signed return receipt, indicating that someone in Attorney Brown’s office accepted the 
notice. 
On August 27, 1996, Attorney Brown moved to withdraw from the case, arguing 
that he had not “seen or heard from the respondent since the respondent was released 
from detention . . . .”  At the time, Attorney Brown acknowledged that Patel’s next 
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hearing was scheduled for September 13, 1996.  The Immigration Court denied the 
motion to withdraw on September 6, 1996.  Patel did not appear for the September 13, 
1996, hearing, and he was ordered deported in absentia on September 16, 1996.  Notice 
of the Immigration Judge=s (“IJ”) decision was mailed to Attorney Brown. 
Thirteen years later, in September 2009, Patel filed a motion to reopen the 
proceedings on the ground that he had not received proper notice of the hearing.  The IJ 
denied the motion, holding that Patel “was provided with proper notice of his deportation 
case.”  The IJ noted that notice of his September 13, 1996, hearing was sent by certified 
by mail to Patel’s attorney of record, that Patel had made no effort to contact his family to 
ascertain the name of the attorney who posted his bond, or to hire another attorney, and 
that he otherwise failed to “take[] reasonable action to determine his obligation to the 
Immigration Court and to his attorney of record.”  The Board of Immigration Appeals 
(“BIA”) dismissed Patel’s appeal.  It agreed that Patel had received proper notice under 
the statutory requirements in effect in 1996.  Even if Attorney Brown was not authorized 
to represent Patel, the BIA concluded that notice was adequate because Patel had not 
complied with the requirement, set forth in the Order to Show Cause, that he notify the 
Immigration Court of address and telephone number changes.  Patel filed a timely 
petition for review from the order.  
We have jurisdiction under INA § 242(a) [8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)].  “We review the 
denial of a motion to reopen a removal order entered in absentia for abuse of discretion.”  
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Cabrera-Perez v. Gonzales, 456 F.3d 109, 115 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing INS v. Doherty, 502 
U.S. 314, 323-24 (1992)).  Thus, in order to succeed on the petition for review, Patel 
must ultimately show that the discretionary decision was somehow arbitrary, irrational, or 
contrary to law.  See Tipu v. INS, 20 F.3d 580, 582 (3d Cir. 1994). 
Because Patel’s immigration proceedings were initiated prior to the 1996 
amendments to the INA, we must apply the notice requirements set forth in former INA 
§ 242B [8 U.S.C. § 1252b].  Under that statute, aliens were to be notified of the time and 
place of their deportation hearings either in person or by certified mail sent to the alien or 
the alien’s counsel of record.  See INA § 242B(a)(2)(A) [8 U.S.C. § 1252b(a)(2)(A)].  In 
the event an alien failed to appear for a hearing, the Government had to prove “by clear, 
unequivocal, and convincing evidence” that the alien was provided with notice of the sort 
described in subsection (a)(2) and that the alien was deportable.  INA § 242B(c)(1) [8 
U.S.C. § 1252b(c)(1)].  Written notice was sufficient if it was “provided at the most 
recent address” furnished by the alien.  Id.  The in absentia deportation order could be 
rescinded if the alien moved to reopen at any time and demonstrated that he did not 
receive notice in accordance with subsection (a)(2).
1
  See INA § 242B(c)(3)(B) [8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252b(c)(3)(B)]. 
                                                 
 
1
 The proceedings could also be reopened at any time if the alien demonstrated 
that he was in custody and that the failure to appear was through no fault of his own.  See 
INA § 242B(c)(3) [8 U.S.C. § 1252b(c)(3)].  Also, an in absentia order of removal could 
be rescinded “upon a motion to reopen filed within 180 days after the date of the order of 
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We conclude that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to 
reopen because, for purposes of rescinding an in absentia removal order under INA 
§ 242B(c)(3), Patel has failed to demonstrate that he “did not receive notice” of the 
hearing.  It is clear that Attorney Brown was notified of the September 13, 1996, hearing.  
See Santana Gonzalez v. Att’y Gen., 506 F.3d 274, 277 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding that a 
strong presumption of receipt applies when a notice from an Immigration Court is sent by 
certified mail).  Furthermore, Patel no longer disputes that Attorney Brown was his 
counsel of record during the relevant time period.  Cf. Sewak v. INS, 900 F.2d 667, 672-
74 (3d Cir. 1990) (suggesting that new hearing would be required if petitioner could 
substantiate his allegations that his attorney was not authorized to enter an appearance on 
his behalf).  In April 1996, Attorney Brown entered his appearance before the 
Immigration Court in Texas.  On the Entry of Appearance form, Attorney Brown checked 
the box labeled “Deportation (Including Bond Redetermination)” to indicate the “type of 
proceeding for which I am entering an appearance.”  Attorney Brown then successfully 
moved for a change of venue to Newark, New Jersey.  Shortly thereafter, on May 24, 
                                                                                                                                                             
deportation if the alien demonstrates that the failure to appear was because of exceptional 
circumstances.”  INA § 242B (c)(3)(A) [8 U.S.C. § 1252b(c)(3)(A)].  Neither of these 
provisions is applicable here because Patel was not in custody, his motion to reopen was 
filed 13 years after he was ordered deported in absentia, and, as noted below, he did not 
act diligently as would be required for equitably tolling the time period for filing a 
motion to reopen based on exceptional circumstances.  See Mahmood v. Gonzales, 427 
F.3d 248, 252 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 
  
6 
 
1996, the Immigration Court notified Attorney Brown by certified letter that Patel’s 
master calendar hearing was scheduled for September 13, 1996.  Although Attorney 
Brown moved to withdraw from the case shortly before the scheduled hearing because he 
had “not seen or heard from” Patel, the IJ denied the motion.  Thus, Attorney Brown was 
Patel’s counsel of record when the hearing notice was sent and on the date of the 
hearing.
2
 
Patel argues that “[f]or the in absentia order to be valid, . . . actual notice [of the 
hearing had to be] effected on [him] through Attorney Brown.”  We disagree.  Service by 
certified mail to an alien’s attorney can satisfy the INA’s notice requirement.  See 
Scorteanu v. INS, 339 F.3d 407, 412 (6th Cir. 2003); see also Anin v. Reno, 188 F.3d 
1273, 1277 (11th Cir. 1999) (“[N]o statutory provision requires an alien to receive actual 
notice of a deportation proceeding.”).  Patel asserts, however, that “the purpose for 
serving [Attorney] Brown, as [his] representative, was defunct ab initio” because 
Attorney Brown was unable to contact him.  Importantly, however, Patel contributed to 
his lack of notice by failing to make any effort to contact Attorney Brown or to keep 
                                                 
 
2
 We agree with the BIA that, even assuming that Attorney Brown was not 
authorized to represent Patel, he cannot establish that he did not receive notice of the 
hearing.  There is no evidence in the record that Patel complied with the requirement, set 
forth in the Order to Show Cause, that he inform the Immigration Court of his current 
mailing address.  See Gomez-Palacios v. Holder, 560 F.3d 354, 360 (5th Cir. 2009) 
(recognizing that “an alien’s failure to receive actual notice of a removal hearing due to 
his neglect of his obligation to keep the immigration court apprised of his current mailing 
address” does not entitle the alien to rescission of an in absentia removal order). 
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himself apprised of his immigration proceedings.
3
  In Bejar v. Ashcroft, 324 F.3d 127, 
129-30 (3d Cir. 2003), the petitioner’s attorney had received notice of the removal 
hearing, but was unable to locate and communicate with his client because she had 
moved and had failed to provide her attorney with her new address.  See Mahmood, 427 
F.3d at 251 (discussing facts of Bejar).  We stated that “we cannot entertain an appeal 
based on [petitioner’s] allegation that she personally failed to receive notice, for it is 
undisputed that her former attorney received timely notice of her removal hearing, and 
service upon her attorney is considered to be legally sufficient.”  Bejar, 324 F.3d at 131.  
Here, given Patel’s lack of diligence, we conclude that he has failed to demonstrate that 
he did not receive notice in accordance with INA § 242B(a)(2).  Consequently, the BIA 
did not abuse its discretion in holding that Patel was not entitled to rescission of the in 
absentia deportation order. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review. 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
 
3
 Patel complains that the Order to Show Cause, which informed him of his 
obligation to update his current address with the Immigration Court, was read to him in 
Hindi, rather than his native language, Gujarati.  Any claim related to the interpretation of 
the Order to Show Cause has been waived, however, because Patel did not exhaust it with 
the BIA.  See Lin v. Att’y Gen., 543 F.3d 114, 120 n.6 (3d Cir. 2008).  He did allege in 
his motion to reopen that that “the only way [he] would have known [of] his obligation to 
apprise the Service of his current address B the papers the Service served upon release on 
bond B had been rain-soaked, waterlogged and obliterated.”  Because Patel has not 
argued this point in his opening brief, we will not consider it.  See Bradley v. Att’y Gen., 
603 F.3d 235, 243 n.8 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding that argument not raised in opening brief is 
waived). 
